Quantum Computing Is Coming. Your Security Should Already Be There.
Quantumize helps organizations identify where classical public-key cryptography creates exposure across their systems, prioritize findings by risk, and plan a migration to NIST-standardized PQC algorithms: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), published in August 2024. NSA CNSA 2.0 (September 2022) requires National Security Systems to complete the transition by 2033.
What is post-quantum cryptography readiness?
Post-quantum cryptography readiness is the process of identifying where classical public-key algorithms such as RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA are used across an organization's systems, assessing their exposure to future cryptographic threats, and migrating to NIST-standardized alternatives: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures, and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for hash-based signatures. The goal is a governed, phased cryptographic migration completed before regulatory deadlines and operational risk converge.
Why Classical Public-Key Cryptography Is Being Replaced
RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA are built on the mathematical hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Shor's algorithm, running on a sufficiently large quantum computer, is expected to solve these problems efficiently. NIST concluded a multi-year evaluation and standardized three post-quantum algorithms in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures, and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for hash-based signatures. These algorithms are designed to resist both classical and quantum computing attacks and are available for production deployment today, typically alongside existing classical cryptography in hybrid mode.
The Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later Risk
Adversaries can intercept and archive encrypted network traffic today using classical infrastructure, storing ciphertext for decryption once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Any data with a long required confidentiality lifetime — government communications, financial records, healthcare data, intellectual property — faces potential exposure right now, before capable hardware fully matures. This is why cryptographic migration cannot wait for quantum computers to arrive at scale. The window of exposure begins at the moment data is captured, not when it is eventually decrypted.
What a Complete Cryptographic Migration Covers
A PQC migration addresses every layer where public-key cryptography is used: TLS connections, public key infrastructure and certificate hierarchies, digital signatures for code signing and software updates, key management systems, APIs, firmware, and software supply chain dependencies. Cryptographic modernization begins with a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) that inventories every algorithm in use, its data sensitivity, and migration urgency. From the CBOM, a risk-scored, phased migration roadmap is built and executed in stages, starting with the highest-exposure systems where harvest-now risk is greatest.
Cryptographic Risk Starts Before Capable Hardware Arrives
RSA and ECC are expected to fall to Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently large quantum computer. The exposure begins today with harvest-now, decrypt-later: data captured now, held for decryption once capable hardware exists.
RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman rest on mathematical problems that Shor's algorithm is expected to solve efficiently on a sufficiently large quantum computer. NIST standardized post-quantum replacements — ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) — in August 2024 specifically to address this.
Nation-state adversaries and sophisticated threat actors are intercepting and archiving encrypted traffic today, storing it for future decryption once cryptographically relevant hardware arrives. Any data with a long confidentiality lifetime is already at risk, regardless of when capable hardware matures.
CISA, NSA, and NIST all urge organizations to begin migrating now. Cryptographic transitions take years: inventorying systems, testing new algorithms, updating protocols, and replacing certificates across supply chains is a multi-year undertaking that cannot begin too early.
Standards bodies and regulators are moving decisively toward NIST-standardized PQC requirements. Organizations that delay will face a convergence of compliance mandates, security vulnerabilities, and operational disruption at exactly the wrong time.
Critical systems depend on layered cryptography: TLS for transport, public key infrastructure for identity, digital signatures for software integrity. A single cryptographic break at scale propagates across networks, supply chains, and the organizations that depend on them.
An Operating Layer for Cryptographic Modernization
Quantumize helps you identify classically vulnerable cryptography, prioritize it by risk, and plan a migration to NIST-standardized PQC algorithms.
Build a comprehensive cryptographic inventory across networks, codebases, data flows, API layers, certificates, libraries, firmware, and supply-chain dependencies. You cannot migrate what you have not mapped.
Score cryptographic exposure by data sensitivity, confidentiality lifetime, regulatory context, and system criticality. Turn findings into a prioritized, phased PQC migration roadmap aligned with joint CISA/NSA/NIST guidance.
Migrate to NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) in hybrid mode alongside classical cryptography. Architect systems so algorithms can be swapped as standards evolve or new guidance emerges.
Built for Organizations with Zero Margin for Error
Enterprises
Governments
Financial Institutions
Critical Infrastructure
Healthcare
Cloud Providers
Built on Authoritative Post-Quantum Standards
NIST finalized FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) in August 2024 — the first post-quantum cryptography standards. NSA CNSA 2.0 (September 2022) requires all National Security Systems to complete PQC migration by 2033. OMB M-23-02 (December 2022) mandates federal agencies to inventory and plan migration of quantum-vulnerable systems.